This paper addresses a paradox in the literature on federal and decentralised states: citizens want their regional governments to do more and yet seem reluctant to embrace the logical consequences of regional control, namely inter-regional policy variation and limited statewide intervention in policy provision. Based on a survey conducted in fourteen regions across Austria, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom we clarify the extent of this devolution paradox and identify variables that seem to mitigate or exacerbate its presence, including strength of regional identity, regional institutional authority and regional economic wealth. The analysis helps us to understand where and how multi-level citizenship operates.
In recent years a number of authors have pointed to a paradox: citizens in federal and regionalised states typically want their regional institutions of government to do more than they do now, and central government institutions less; i yet at the same time they appear
reluctant to embrace what would appear to be logical consequences, namely more interregional variation, and less intervention to secure state-wide equity, in public policy provision.
Though aspects of this paradox have been identified in Germany (e.g. GRUBE 2001) and Canada (c.f. JEFFERY 2006) , it has received particular attention in the post-devolution
United Kingdom, where powerful popular support for further-reaching devolution in Scotland and Wales appears to co-exist with continuing preferences for state-wide uniformity of policy (CURTICE, 2006: 102-9; JEFFERY, 2005; WYN JONES and SCULLY, 2009 ). What we call the 'devolution paradox' is intriguing, not only because of its potential political implications in an era characterised by 'the rise of regional authority' (HOOGHE, et al. 2010 ), but also -and centrally for our current purposes -for the profound analytical questions it raises about public attitudes towards, and expectations of, governmental institutions in systems of multi-layered authority. In this paper we will seek to specify some of those questions more fully as well as provide some necessarily tentative answers.
Several potential explanations for the devolution paradox may be identified in the literature. Reflecting on the UK, James Mitchell (2006: 165-6 ) has argued that the pressures which led to devolution in Scotland and Wales had little to do with the advocacy of distinctive policy agendas per se, but are rather better understood in terms of reclaiming ownership of the political process after a period under Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major when the UK government appeared indifferent or even hostile to Scottish and Welsh concerns.
On this view, devolution was above all a process of democratic renewal of which a distinctive policy agenda was a by-product. A related view that has been rehearsed both in work on the UK (JEFFERY 2009 ) and in wider comparative analysis (e.g. BANTING 2006) , is that federal and devolved states embody distinctive logics: a logic of proximity and responsiveness of decision-making at a regional scale within the state; and a logic of equity and solidarity that is effected on a state-wide scale through uniform policies and services.
While these logics may appear to stand in tension with one another, citizens may well endorse both as desirable, producing the seemingly paradoxical responses that public attitudes surveys reveal.
Whether or not citizens do endorse both logics, and how they reconcile any crosspressures they feel in simultaneously pursuing collective goals at regional and state-wide scales, is, however, an open question. It remains open because, with too few exceptions, public attitudes have mostly been explored by political scientists at state-wide scales (and, increasingly, through aggregation of state-wide samples at trans-state scales). Only in some places, but then often rather patchily, have public attitudes on political participation and public policy been explored at regional scales. The data that inform this paper are an initial attempt to build a more systematic evidence base on how citizens negotiate -paradoxically or not -multi-level government within the state. These data were generated by the 'Citizenship after the Nation-State' (CANS) project which fielded a common survey questionnaire to randomly selected samples of at least 900 respondents in 14 regions in five European states in early 2009. The survey was designed to elicit views on how public authority should best be organised at regional and state-wide scales, and of how that authority should be used to make or influence public policies.
ii
The CANS project has two inter-linked theoretical points of departure (as developed more fully in WINCOTT 2010 and JEFFERY 2012) . The first is in T.H. Marshall's ([1950] 1992) understanding of 'citizenship' as the product of the interaction over centuries of different clusters of civil, political and social rights and their eventual bundling at the scale of the 'nation-state' after the Second World War.
iii The second is the identification of 'methodological nationalism', the unreflective use of the state as a unit of analysis (see e.g. MARTINS 1974; CHERNILO 2007) , as a problem not just for the understanding of social and political phenomena at trans-state scales (a problem now widely recognised e.g. by BECK 2007; SCHOLTE 2005) , but also at regional scales within the state. Focusing attention on the state-wide scale -as some of the key branches of political science have long doneruns the danger of leaving politics at other scales 'hidden from view' (WIMMER and GLICK-SCHILLER 2002: 302) . One of those key branches -welfare state analysis -has, of course, been enduringly shaped by Marshall's work, in particular the notion that citizenship was somehow 'completed' by the addition of social rights to earlier civil and political rights with the establishment of the national welfare state. That association of social rights with the 'nation-state' has had a powerful normative legacy, shaping many of the key contributions to the analysis of the welfare state over the last decades, and underpinning widespread assumptions that the state-wide scale is a 'natural' one for the pursuit of social welfare (JEFFERY and WINCOTT 2010: 182-6; cf. BANTING 2006; JEFFERY 2002 with earlier surveys to establish two or more time points for comparison. Third, although our project title may perhaps appear a little polemical -Citizenship after the Nation-State -we do not in fact seek to claim that the 'nation-state' has become redundant or rendered insignificant as regional-scale politics become more important. We are clear that the state-wide scale remains the primary focus of most citizens, political parties and interest groups in most areas of political contestation in most advanced democracies. Our focus, by contrast, is on the transformative effect on the (nation-)state of the growth of public authority, political mobilisation and policy variation at the regional scale. The growing importance of regional scale politics suggests that the state has to some extent become 'de-nationalised', and recast as a more complex multi-levelled form of political organisation that needs to respond to the demands of distinctive regional political communities as well as the political community as organised at the state-wide scale. If we were to identify a devolution paradox among citizens in these regions, we would expect to find evidence of strong preference for (more) regional government alongside a preference for uniform, statewide policy outcomes. We would also expect this paradox to be less evident in historic, institutionally powerful and economically strong regions, which are likely to benefit from and be more relaxed about intra-state variation. We might expect the strongest evidence of the paradox to be found in 'intermediate' regions. Consistently 'statist' attitudes might be expected in the most feeble of regions -those that are institutionally or economically weak and lack historic foundations -although if the preference for (more) regional government turns out to be widely spread even in 'weak' regions, then these could turn out to be among the most paradoxical. We explore these expectations below first through a discussion of aggregate level region-by-region findings and second at the individual level across the dataset as a whole. We then drill down into the data by means of further interregional comparison. The sense that regional government should do more rather than less than it does now is confirmed in Table 4 which reports responses on a set of constitutional options ranged either side of the status quo situation in the various regions. Obviously the status quo position differs from place to place, which means that respondents almost certainly have different things in mind when envisaging 'more' or 'fewer' powers than now. What is significant, though, is that everywhere the more powers option easily outweighs the fewer powers option and is in eight out of 14 cases the most popular option. In some cases -Catalonia, Scotland, Bavaria and Wales -a significant group also favours a more radical version of 'more powers':
Mapping the Devolution Paradox

Support for More Regional Government …
independence (the table is ordered by adding responses in the columns 'more powers' and 'independence'). The combined message from Tables 2-4 is that whatever kind of region they live in -whether or not historic, institutionally entrenched or wealthy -citizens across all our regions appear to want their regional institutions to do more rather than less.
… But Not Inter-Regional Policy Variation?
The preference at an abstract level for more regional control is not, however, generally reproduced when our respondents were asked more concrete questions about policy. These include: which level of government was 'most suitable' for 'dealing with' particular policy fields or challenges (Table 5 ); whether particular issues should be dealt with uniformly across the state or a matter for each region to decide for itself (Table 6) ; and whether 'money should be transferred from the richer parts' of the state 'to the poorer parts so that everyone can have similar levels of public services' (Table 7) . Catalonia -for dealing with crime. In four regions there is a plurality preference for regional control of the environment, although the balance between region and state control of this policy field is affected by the relatively strong preferences for the EU as most suitable in environmental policy. Perhaps the most striking results are those for the two classic social policy fields of health and education. There, the same four regions -Catalonia, Scotland, Wales and Galicia -stand out as preferring regional-level action. In these regions, which possess well established nationalist movements and a self perception as a historic nation, citizens appear to be more consistent in their preferences, at least in respect of education and health policies, favouring both regional control in the abstract and regional control in specific policy areas. In all other regions the state is identified as most suitable for dealing with problems in health and education, generally by around two-thirds or more respondents. is even more strongly underlined in Table 6 . This makes more explicit a choice between statewide uniformity and regional-scale decision-making. The Table offers 56 cases (that is, 14 regions across four policy issues) and for only three is there a preference for the region to decide, all in Catalonia. Scotland, Wales and Galicia generally have the next highest preferences for regional decision, although they are some way behind Catalonia. Outside of these four cases the lowest preference for uniformity on any of the policy issues is 70 per cent (Ile de France, old age care). The Austrian regions are most pro-uniformity, with close to 90
per cent of respondents in each of them preferring uniform action rather than regional decision, with the French and German regions only a little behind. The table has been ordered by ranking the regions where respondents most disagreed with rich-poor transfers. Two aspects of the responses are particularly striking. The first is that a majority of respondents everywhere felt there should be state-level government action to even out economic disparities, and that richer regions should transfer resources to poorer regions (except in Salzburg, where this was narrowly the plurality view). As suggested also in Table 6 , a sense of statewide equity clearly remains powerful.
But second, those respondents that disagree most with the propositions in Table 7 are a different group than those -in the four stateless nations -more likely to favour regional-scale action in education, health and to an extent in other policy fields. Rather, the regions where there are higher levels of disagreement with inter-regional transfers are also among the economically stronger regions in our analysis. The middle and right-hand columns of the table report and rank regions that subjectively were felt (in the views of respondents), and objectively were (in terms of regional GDP), economically stronger than other regions in that state. The top six for each economic ranking are highlighted to ease comparison, with four appearing in the top six for opposition to transfers, subjective and objective wealth: Bavaria, Salzburg, Upper Austria and Vienna. Equally regions at the bottom of the objective and subjective rankings are generally those that most strongly endorse interventions, possibly to compensate for their own regional economic weakness: Wales, Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha and Brittany. There is a dividing line here which suggests that a general commitment to statewide equity may be under challenge by a lesser willingness of people in more affluent regions to cross-subsidise less well off regions.
v This initial analysis has opened up a number of perspectives on the devolution paradox.
Four, in particular, deserve to be highlighted:
1. Some regions are less paradoxical than others. Specifically Catalonia, Scotland, Wales and Galicia are the four most consistent regions in matching preferences for more regional government with preferences for regional policy responsibility among those we analyse here.
2. Regions in Austria, Germany and France appear paradoxical in wanting both more influence and powers for regional institutions, while also preferring state-level policy responsibilities and statewide uniformity of policy.
3. Richer regions appear in the main least likely to support inter-regional transfers to support statewide equity in the delivery of public services; there is a suggestion here that the devolution paradox is qualified by relative regional economic strength.
4. Yet on questions of statewide uniformity and inter-regional transfers majorities everywhere (with marginal exceptions in Catalonia) appear to have preferences for action by state-level governments and/or with state-wide reach. Even in the four less paradoxical regions and the richest regions there remains a powerful commitment to equity and solidarity at a statewide scale.
Nonetheless, looking beyond these important variations and qualifications, at the aggregate level at least, our analysis suggests that claims that a devolution paradox exists are well founded. Strong support for increased regional authority tends to coexist with strong support for uniform policy outcomes across the territory of the state. Moreover, and further highlighting the apparent contradictions, support for increased regional authority in the abstract tends not to be accompanied by support for regional authority in at least those policy areas featured in our survey.
The existence at the aggregate level of a devolution paradox itself represents a suggestive research finding. We know that aggregate voting results, for example, show differential voting patterns in regional as opposed to state-wide elections, and in particular the tendency of regionalist parties to prosper in the former to a far greater extent than the latter (DE WINTER 1998 , DE WINTER et al 2006 , HOPKIN 2009 , HOPKIN and BRADBURY 2006 , HOUGH and JEFFERY 2006 , MÜLLER-ROMMEL 1998 , SWENDEN and MADDENS 2008 . These findings may well become more intelligible when viewed through the prism of the devolution paradox. But as the example of election results -a nonpareil example of aggregated behaviour -reminds us, to focus on aggregate results alone is insufficient if we are to understand the individual-level attitudes and behaviours that give rise to overall outcomes. Similarly, to posit and even demonstrate the existence of a devolution paradox at the aggregate level tells us very little about attitudes at the individual level: it is to this task that we now turn. Here we compare individuals across the 14 regions through multivariate analysis. The models set out in Table 8 take as their dependent variables three individual components of the devolution paradox: attitudes to the suitability of regional institutions for dealing with policy issue and problems (described in Table 5 ); preferences for policy uniformity (Table 6) ; and preferences for inter-regional transfers (Table 7) . By understanding the types of individuals most likely to support regional control or policy uniformity we can perhaps help to account for the presence of the paradox. Our analysis employs the level of attachment to the region, the importance attributed to the decisions of regional institutions and subjective perceptions of relative regional economic performance as independent variables.
From aggregate to individual level
A mix of demographic and political control variables are deployed. The demographic control variables include age, gender, marital status, religiosity, and ethnic minority status. The political control variables include political interest, two measures of political efficacy and three assessments of current or desired regional influence. In the case of the latter these are:
the belief that the region should have the most influence over regional affairs, support for independence and the belief that the region is most 'concerned with the needs and wishes of' people in the region.
In addition, we have included a binary control variable that indicates whether the respondent is an inhabitant of one of the 'historic regions', namely Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Galicia, which our previous analysis has suggested are characterised by different patterns of attitudes.
The results in Table 8 contain the unstandardised regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for ordinal logistic regressions. Each of the three columns represents a different dependent variable. The results show that our independent and control variables account for around one fifth of the variation in our dependent variables on policy control and policy uniformity, but much less for the variable on inter-regional solidarity.
Reading across the analysis, four key findings emerge. First, the demographic variables, in general, do not account for significant variation in our dependent variables; no single demographic variable matters consistently across the dependent variables. Second, when we turn to the independent variables we see that regional attachment and the importance attributed to regional decisions are consistently significant for the policy variables and in the expected direction. A greater sense of regional attachment and greater perception of regional institutional importance is positively associated with regional policy suitability, and negatively associated with state-wide policy uniformity, even when we control for all other variables in the model. Perceived regional wealth is a significant and negative predictor of inter-regional solidarity and policy uniformity -those who feel that they live in a wealthier region are less likely to support state intervention and more likely to support regional policy variation -and a positive predictor of regional policy suitability.
Third, our three attitudinal control variables, two for efficacy and one for political interest, matter in most cases but sometimes in surprising ways. Those with higher levels of political interest are more likely to support regional policy control and are less supportive of policy uniformity. Our two measures of political efficacy probe both so-called internal efficacy ('people like me have no say') and external efficacy ('political actors don't care').
The more dissatisfied one is with regional politics (the less efficacy one feels at the regional level) the less likely one is to feel that regional institutions are suitable to deal with policy problems. Only for policy uniformity -for which, it will be recalled, support tends to be particularly strong -is efficacy irrelevant.
The three measures of current or desired regional influence perform fairly consistently across the dependent variables. A belief that the region should have the most influence and support for independence are both positively associated with regional policy control and negatively associated with policy uniformity. Support for independence is the stronger predictor in each case. A sense that the region is more concerned with people's needs and wishes is also a positive predictor of support for regional policy control and a negative predictor of support for policy uniformity.
Fourth, and finally, the binary variable that identifies whether or not an individual lives in one of the four historic regions -Scotland, Wales, Catalonia and Galicia -is also a significant predictor across the three dependent variables, and in the expected direction.
As will now be obvious, in clear contrast to our findings at the aggregate level, the results of this multivariate analysis do not support the existence of a devolution paradox at the level of the individual. Rather, viewed through this optic, attitudes are far more consistent:
preferences for regional decision-making and more regional government appear to be accompanied by a belief that regional institutions are suitable for dealing with policy issues problems, a greater openness for non-uniform policies as well as (but less consistently) lower support for inter-regional transfers.
Types of Region
This dissonance between the individual and aggregate levels -between the regression analysis and the descriptive statistics -appears puzzling and prompts further reflection. One way of investigating it further is to continue with an individual level analysis, seeking to identify those respondents holding paradoxical views. Given our concern about the relationship between individuals, regions and states, here we limit ourselves to locating the proportion of respondents holding 'paradoxical' views in our various regions.
We operationalize the concept of paradoxical individuals in three different ways. First, what we call the Policy Paradox applies to individuals who believe the region should have most powers but do not support regional policy control in any of our policy fields. Second, the Uniformity Paradox focuses on abstract regional control and support for policy uniformity.
Here individuals believe the region should have most influence but have above average support for policy uniformity. On average, individuals support uniformity across four of our five fields so we have coded support for uniformity as uniformity across all 5 fields. Finally our Total Paradox brings together abstract regional control, total uniformity and no regional policy control (ie. Region most influence = 1, uniformity for all fields = 1, regional policy = 0). Returning to regional level analysis, an obvious starting point, then, is the historic regions.
The four 'least paradoxical' regions are all stateless nations with strong territorial identities, as confirmed in Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 presents findings on a bipolar identity scale (commonly known as the Moreno question), which allows respondents both to claim exclusive regional or state-level identities, but also to claim dual identities which are either balanced or lean towards one or other of the identity poles. Table 10 is ordered by those regions with the 'most regional' identities (that is adding together the respondents who claim an exclusive or a predominantly regional identity). Scotland stands out as the 'most regional' of our regions, with Catalonia, Wales and Galicia also having significantly higher levels of regional than state identity. As reported earlier in Table 3 a majority in all 14 regions felt that the region should have most influence in the abstract. It would be logical to expect that the strength of support for regional influence would correlate positively with support for regional institutions as suitable for dealing with policy problems. Yet Figure 3 shows that the general trend across the regions is for a negative relationship. Believing that the region should have the most influence is negatively associated with support for regional control over various policy areas. But again there are two stories. The four historic regions display the 'right' or consistent relationship between the two variables with support for more influence positively associated with stronger support for regional suitability. Nine of the other 10 do not: the Austrian, French and German regions. These cluster around a belief that the region should have most influence which is as strong as in Catalonia and stronger than the other three historic regions. Yet that belief is not matched by support for regional policy suitability. It is in these regions that a devolution paradox stands revealed.
In the final region, Castilla-La Mancha, the lowest preference for regional influence is matched by a low preference for regional policy suitability. Here again, then, is a more consistent set of preferences. Seen in this light, Castilla-La Mancha seems to occupy a position that is more consistent with our historic regions than the nine paradoxical regions, although in its particular case the relationship between the two variables demonstrates support for strong statism (or weak regionalism) rather than its opposite. If we interpret the data from Castilla-La Mancha in this manner, there is an emergent distinction not just between types of region but between types of state, with respondents in the UK and Spain seemingly sharing a similar logic of responses, and respondents in Austria, France and Germany a different, shared logic. anything the belief that the state should have most influence produces less support for uniformity than the mean, and if anything the belief that the region should have most influence produces less support for regional decision-making. This is counterintuitive, but also chimes with the finding in Figure 3 .
Types of State: 'either-or' vs 'both-and'
Second, in the UK and Spanish regions (but also in Bavaria), there is in each case a positive (and in most cases a significant) relationship between preference for state influence and policy uniformity, and between preference for regional influence and regional decision.
There is a polarisation of attitudes between a (smaller n) group of 'pro-statists' and a (larger n)
group of 'pro-regionalists'. Strikingly in all cases in these six regions, the pro-statists are more consistent in their pro-statism than the pro-regionalists are in their pro-regionalism.
This polarisation of attitudes appears consistent with the continued conflict that exists around the appropriate form of territorial constitution for the UK and Spain (and the enduring concern by successive Bavarian governments to decentralise the German federal system). It suggests there are contested understandings of multi-level statehood that produce two groups of people -pro-devolution regionalists, and pro-centralisation statists -there is disagreement, but no contradiction evident in these attitudes towards devolution (or indeed a centralisation).
Multi-level statehood in the UK and Spain (and Bavaria) appears in the eyes of citizens -at least in the cases we are able to report on -to present either-or choices: authority and competences should reside at either one level of government or the other, rather than be shared between them.
This polarisation generally does not exist, or is very much more muted in Austria, France and Germany. There are -as Table 11 suggests -no entrenched camps of vociferous pro-statists and vociferous pro-regionalists. In all nine regions (including, but at a lower level, Bavaria) in these states there appears to be much less of a sense of having to choose between regional and state-level government. The absence of a perception of contest between the two levels of government is clearest in Austria. The Austrian regions provide the top three in the ranking on whether the region should have most influence (Table 3 ) and the top three in the ranking on preferences for policy uniformity (if we average out the responses in Table 6 ).
Though on the surface these responses appear paradoxical, there is little sense of crosspressure or self-contradiction in them. The great majority of Austrian respondents are 'bothand' respondents. Their statism appears more to be part of, rather than contradictory to, their regionalism.
This apparent absence of contradiction may seem counterintuitive for respondents from a federal state, who might be expected to be comfortable with regional-scale decisionmaking and with it non-uniform policy outcomes. The Austrian version of federalism, however, is very different from the separated power models of federalism in the Anglophone tradition. The former is characterised by an interlocking structure of political authority in which the key locale of regional influence is in institutions of intergovernmental cooperation with central government rather than in the regional institutions themselves. In this 'shared rule' setting it may not be contradictory for Austrians to prefer strong regional influence and statewide policy uniformity; regional influence may be expressed in co-determining statewide policy outcomes. In this sense Austria is a 'both-and' multi-level state in which proregionalist and pro-statist attitudes among citizens can co-exist without contradiction because regions and state co-exist without (very much) conflict in a cooperative and integrated multilevel state structure. A similar case might be made for the German regions, which are also embedded in a system of (even more fully) interlocked, multi-level decision-making, with even the more autonomist Bavarians presenting responses closer to the other German regions than to historic regions in the UK and Spain. It is possible also that the French system of cumul des mandats, with key figures often holding office at local, regional and national level simultaneously, offers an informal, functional equivalent to the more formal interlocking of levels in Austria and Germany.
Though some of the questions in the CANS survey allow us to probe 'both-and' responses for region and state, we did not set out to generate evidence of 'shared rule' attitudes which might without contradiction combine support for strong regional institutions and statewide policies. So the suggestion that the co-existence of pro-regionalism and prostatism particularly in the Austrian, but also the German and perhaps French regions reflects the logic of shared-rule systems is therefore, at this stage, speculative. It does though allow us to move to some concluding reflections on the devolution paradox.
Conclusion: Reflections on the Devolution Paradox
Three key arguments emerge from the preceding discussion. The first is a challenge to the view that the logics of proximity/responsiveness and equity/solidarity in federal and devolved states necessarily stand in tension with one another, competing in a zero-sum game that ends up with one 'dominating' or 'trumping' the other (Banting 2006: 47, 64 ). Initially we identified a 'devolution paradox' with respondents apparently wishing more power to be vested at the regional level without embracing greater policy control or diversity across regions. But the idea of a paradox can refer to an apparent contradiction that dissolves on closer or deeper analysis. Our analysis -at both individual and regional levels -explained away a good deal of the apparent contradiction to which the devolution paradox seemed to point. Citizens may, quite logically, pursue collective goals through institutions at multiple levels and indeed see strong regional institutions as the guarantors of the common, statewide citizenship they prefer. In this sense -if this interpretation is correct -the CANS respondents in Austria, Germany and France are not contradictory beings, but sophisticated multi-level citizens.
The second is that our respondents in the UK and Spain are not that paradoxical either.
But here there is a competition or polarisation between those who prefer a state-wide scale for pursuing collective goals and those who prefer a regional scale. Even here, though, and even in the most regionalist regions of Catalonia and Scotland, most people have some attachment to, and see significant policy roles for, the state as a whole. Citizens here may be more divided, but they remain multi-levelled in their attitudes to politics and policy. Or at least they do with the exception of statist Castilla-La Mancha. And it is here that we must enter an important caveat about our findings reflecting the limitations of our dataset.
As was made clear in our introduction, the regions surveyed in CANS were selected in order to provide a good spread across our three independent variables of regional identity, regional institutional authority, and strength of regional economy. They were not intended to England. This in turn suggests that while a sense of multi-levelled citizenship may well exist in the periphery, it is far from self-evident that this is also the case across the rest of the state.
In short, the example of Castilla-La Mancha reminds us that not only are there divisions between regionalists and statists within the four historic regions, but that there are almost certainly important divisions between the different parts of the two historic states of which they form a part; divisions that are not only impossible to capture through our dataset but also of great potential political salience.
The clear differences between Austrian, French and German regions, on the one hand, and -caveats included -those in Spain and the UK, on the other, lead to a third and final point. Despite a research design that takes the regional scale as a unit of analysis, the fourteen regional cases cluster logically into groups defined by the states in which they are located.
Taking serious, comparative account of multi-layered government within the state emphatically does not imply bypassing or otherwise somehow ignoring the state level. Quite the opposite: states and state form matter. They will also continue to matter. While data presented in this paper serve to confirm that regional secession is not beyond the bounds of possibility in at least some cases, the general picture presented is of diverse forms of multilevelled statehood; the compound adjective modifying, of course, but not effacing the noun.
Which, in conclusion, is precisely why the type of research facilitated by the CANS project is so important. Inevitably, as a first attempt of its kind, it has its limitations. Fourteen regions at one point in time are not enough regions in enough states to draw definitive conclusions about the pattern and content, the puzzles or the paradoxes, of contemporary multi-level citizenship.
Neither does it allow us to say anything about the direction and extent of change over time.
Nonetheless, by demonstrating that it is possible to organise and co-ordinate such an ambitious programme of survey work, including within its reach so many regions in which similar scholarly activity has never taken place before, it has represented a vital first step. Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by column c. Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by more powers + independence. Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by % disagree with transfers to poorer regions.
* By convention in German public attitudes work, Thuringian respondents were asked to compare their situation with the other east German regions, not with the rest of Germany as a whole. The Thuringian figure of 41% is therefore an outlier. If comparing with the rest of Germany as a whole we might expect a figure closer to the bottom group of Galicia, Castilla-La Mancha and Wales. Results are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses for ordinal logistic regression. ***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.1 Categorical variables (gender, ethnicity, marital status, place of birth, region should influence, region more concerned, historic nation) have been entered as factors rather than covariates so that coefficients give scores for trait present (1) rather than trait absent (0). The signs of coefficients are merely reversed if they are entered as covariates. Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707 Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by % Total Paradox. Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707. Rows sorted by column c. Source: Citizenship After the Nation-State, N=12707, * Pearson Chi-Square <0.05
ENDNOTES
i While we recognise the sensitivities attached to the word 'region' in places like Scotland that are widely considered to be 'nations', we have nonetheless retained the usual academic convention of using 'regional' to describe tiers of government smaller in scale than the state and bigger than local government. All alternatives appear to raise equally intractable -if different -problems.
ii It might be noted that while the relationship between the regional and state-wide scales was the primary focus of the project, the questionnaire also probed attitudes to the broader European and narrower local scales where appropriate.
iii 'Nation-state' is another problematic term, not least given the limited extent to which national communities and state boundaries coincide in Europe and elsewhere. We prefer to use 'state' and 'state-wide' as a more neutral terminology determined by the administrative boundaries that demarcate states.
iv The absence of systematically comparative regional level public attitudes research is one aspect of the 'methodological nationalism' we critique here. 
